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Abstract—With the development and deployment of IEC 61850 
based smart substations, cybersecurity vulnerabilities of 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are 
increasingly emerging. In response to the emergence of 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities in smart substations, a test-bed is 
indispensable to enable cybersecurity experimentation. In this 
paper, a comprehensive and realistic cyber-physical test-bed has 
been built to investigate potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities 
and the impact of cyber-attacks on IEC 61850 based smart 
substations. This test-bed is close to a real production type 
environment, and has the ability to carry out end-to-end testing 
of cyber-attacks and physical consequences. A fuzz testing 
approach is proposed for detecting IEC 61850 based intelligent 
electronic devices (IEDs) and validated in the proposed test-bed. 
Index Terms—Smart Substation, IEC 61850, Cybersecurity, 
Test-bed, Fuzz testing 
I. INTRODUCTION 
IEC 61850 [1] based smart substations have played a 
significant role in power system operation, becoming 
increasingly complex and interconnected as state-of-the-art 
information and communication technologies (ICT) are 
adopted. The increased complexity and interconnection of 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems 
have exposed them to a wide range of cybersecurity threats. 
These threats are not only external, such as terrorists, hackers, 
competitors, or industrial espionage, but also from internal 
entities, such as ex-employees, disgruntled employees, vendor 
personnel for maintenance and troubleshooting, and site 
engineers. In practice, a threat actor may gain unauthorized 
cyber access to SCADA systems, exploit vulnerabilities and 
thereafter launch elaborate attacks which may lead to 
catastrophic physical damage. 
Although the IEC 62351 standard [2] has provided a 
framework for the cybersecurity design of the IEC 61850 
protocol, problems remain and major manufacturers do not 
generally implement adequate security in their intelligent 
electronic devices (IEDs) [3]. In recent years, during the 
construction of smart substations, utilities and manufacturers 
have paid more attention to the interoperation of devices and 
implementation of functions, than to cybersecurity 
consideration and testing. Nevertheless, research on the cost-
effective cybersecurity for IEC 61850 based smart substations 
is still at an early stage. Much more in-depth investigation and 
analysis of specific vulnerabilities and cyber-attacks is 
required. To this end, this paper proposes a comprehensive 
and realistic SCADA-specific cyber-physical test-bed to 
investigate potential vulnerabilities using simulated cyber-
attacks. This test-bed environment meets this challenge by 
enabling real attack scenarios to be analyzed, and effective 
cybersecurity countermeasure technologies to be proposed and 
evaluated for the smart substation cyber domain. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A.  IEC 61850  
IEC 61850 is an international standard for the design of 
electrical substation automation, which is developed by 
international electrotechnical commission (IEC) technical 
committee 57 (TC57). The abstract data models defined in 
IEC 61850 can be mapped to many protocols. Current 
mappings in this standard are mainly to manufacturing 
message specification (MMS), generic object oriented 
substation event (GOOSE), and sampled measure values 
(SMV) [4], [5]. The MMS protocol is applied in the substation 
level based on the Client/Server mode, which runs over 
TCP/IP networks. The GOOSE and the SMV protocols are 
both based on publish/subscription mechanism in substation 
local area networks (LANs) using high speed switched 
Ethernet. The IEC 61850 protocol stack is shown in Fig. 1. In 
terms of the transport layer in Fig. 1, international standards 
organization (ISO) transport (ISO/IEC 8073) means 
connection oriented transport protocol (COTP), and RFC 1006 
stands for ISO transport services on top of the TCP (TPKT) 
(The TCP port for TPKT traffic is 102). 
B. Fuzz Testing 
In conventional IT security, fuzz testing [6] is regarded as 
one of the most useful techniques in finding vulnerabilities of 
software and protocol implementations [7]. In protocol 
fuzzing, a fuzzer sends virtually unlimited test cases using 
invalid or falsely manipulated data, within the framework 
defined by a given protocol specification, to a protocol  
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Figure 1.  IEC 61850 protocol stack 
implementation. Using effective test cases as input 
information enables security vulnerabilities to be found in the 
application, which were not anticipated by the protocol 
designers or software developers. Therefore, fuzz testing is an 
effective approach to improve the security and reliability of 
protocol implementations [8]. 
III. INVESTIGATION ON CYBERSECURITY IN IEC 61850 
BASED SMART SUBSTATIONS 
A. Cyber-Physical Test-Bed 
In order to investigate potential cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities in IEC 61850 based smart substations, a cyber-
physical test-bed has been built, as shown in Fig. 2. The test-
bed consists of the simulation level, process level, bay level 
and substation level. In the simulation level, a real time digital 
simulator (RTDS) is utilized to model multiple power system 
scenarios and simulate transient characteristics and behaviors 
of modelled power systems. A universal relay test set and 
commissioning tool, as a programmable voltage and current 
source, is an optional simulator to realize steady and transient 
simulation. In the process level, merging units (MUs) are 
connected in the SV/IEEE1588 network, and intelligent 
terminals (ITs) are connected in the GOOSE/IEEE1588 
network. The process level networks are Ethernet switch-
based fiber-optic networks. The bay level IEDs include relays, 
measure-control devices, fault recorder, network analyzer, and 
time synchronization IED. The bay level IEDs are connected 
in the process level networks and the substation level network. 
The substation level consists of the monitoring system, 
engineering workstation, SCADA database, remote terminal 
unit (RTU), and a laptop to launch cyber-attacks. The 
substation level network, a switch-based cable network, 
supports MMS, GOOSE and simple network time protocol 
(SNTP). The control center communicates with the smart 
substation using IEC 60870-5-104. 
B. Investigation of Cyber-Attacks in the Smart Substation 
In the test-bed, a number of cyber-attacks are simulated 
and investigated as follows, 
 
Figure 2.  Cyber-physical test-bed of IEC 61850 based smart substation 
1) Reconnaissance attack：A reconnaissance attack allows 
an attacker to identify potential targets before attacking. In 
this test-bed, the reconnaissance attack is launched by the 
laptop, as shown by the yellow triangle with the number 1 in 
Fig. 2, to obtain the online IED information such as IP 
addresses. An attacker could utilize this information to launch 
more effective attacks. 
2) Malformed packet attack: In this test-bed, malicious IEC 
61850 client software generates malformed packets based on 
the IEC 61850 protocol and sends them to IEDs. The 
malformed packet may crash the IEC 61850 protocol stack 
and cause IED communication failure or status exception, 
which could threaten secure and reliable operation of the 
smart substation. 
3) DoS attack：This DoS attack is launched to occupy all 
the enable report control blocks of IEDs, which are 
instantiated at configuration time in the Logical Node (LN) in 
this test-bed. The targeted IED cannot respond to normal 
connection requests.  
4) Address resolution protocol (ARP) spoofing attack: In 
the test-bed environment, an ARP spoofing attack [9] is 
launched by the laptop to broadcast ARP packets with the IP 
address of the monitoring system in the substation level 
network. After the attack, the IEDs communicate with the 
malicious laptop, rather than the monitoring system. 
5) Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack: The MITM attack 
allows an attacker to redirect communication traffic between 
the monitoring system and the IED to the malicious laptop in 
the substation level network [9]. On one hand the attacker 
sends malicious remote control commands and modified 
protective setting values by impersonating the monitoring 
system, on the other hand the attacker, the impersonated IEDs, 
sends false, abnormal, or even malformed messages to the 
original monitoring system. In this test-bed environment, the 
MITM attacks can make the monitoring system and the IEDs 
abnormal, and even make the grid failure possible.   
6) Configuration tampering: SCL files are the foundations 
of the secure, steady, reliable operations of IEC 61850 based 
smart substations. In this test-bed, the threat actor has 
tampered with the configured IED description (CID) file in 
the protection relay, and the relay operates incorrectly when 
simulated grid faults appear.  
7) Operation system/database attack: The operation 
system/database is exploited using known vulnerabilities in 
this test-bed. For example, VxWorks, the embedded real-time 
operating system in some IEDs, is attacked using the wind 
river debug vulnerability (WDV).  
The possible effects of the cyber-attacks on smart 
substations, as outlined above, are shown in Table I.  
C. Substation Attack Scenarios 
According to the above-mentioned investigation in the 
test-bed, potential substation attack scenarios are identified as 
follows,  
? Stuxnet-like malware can propagate via infected 
removable USB drives and LAN communications, as 
shown by the yellow triangle with the number 2 in Fig. 
2, and can be designed to sabotage SCADA systems 
with direct physical consequences. 
? A maintenance engineer’s laptop is directly connected 
to the switch network in the smart substation, as 
shown by the yellow triangle with the number 1 in Fig. 
2.  
? Due to the maintenance engineer’s unintended misuse, 
the laptop may gain access to unauthorized IEDs from  
TABLE I.  THE IMPACT OF CYBER-ATTACKS ON SMART SUBSTATIONS 
                             Cyber-attack 
Impact 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 
Failure to tripping protection    ? ?  
Unwanted operation of protection    ? ?  
Blocking protection    ? ?  
Disruption of communication for 
protection ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Network disruption within 
substation ? ?    ? 
Abnormal or disruption of 
monitoring system ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Denial of service from control 
centre ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Misjudgement of dispatchers    ?   
Erroneous post analysis    ?  ? 
 
other manufacturers, which may cause 
communication disruption, or even operation failure. 
Traditional malware such as viruses and worms, or 
advanced Stuxnet-like malware may penetrate the IT 
control environment of the smart substation via a 
laptop. Furthermore, the same laptop has the potential 
to infect a number of smart substations by the same 
maintenance engineer. 
? During maintenance, the engineer may access the 
Internet by wireless to download electronic materials 
or perform remote maintenance. This may be utilized 
by a threat actor as a conduit to penetrate the 
substation automation system. 
The smart substation is also vulnerable to further 
exploitation: it lacks real-time detection approaches for 
cybersecurity; the IEDs lack the ability to identify whether 
control commands are from a legal user; and the IEDs in the 
smart substation typically lack cybersecurity penetration 
testing before being put into operation. To attempt to address 
these practical cyber-security problems, the next section 
proposes a fuzz testing approach to detect IEC 61850 
protocol vulnerabilities for IEDs in the test-bed. 
IV. FUZZ TESTING FOR IEC 61850 
In a smart substation, an attacker may send invalid or 
unidentified packets to “fuzz” IEDs using a malicious IEC 
61850 client illegally connected to the substation level 
network. Such injected packets, including abnormal remote 
commands and set points, may bring a normal process into 
unintended states and/or cause an IEC 61850 server to freeze 
or other unexpected behaviors [11]. Malformed packets 
transmitted to IEDs may lead to denial of service by crashing 
an IEC 61850 protocol stack [12]. One of the mitigation 
measures for the malformed packet attack is to test the 
robustness of IEDs using the fuzzing technology, identify 
potential protocol vulnerabilities, and then feed back to 
manufacturers to address the found issues by upgrading 
programs before real operation of smart substations.  
IEC 61850, based on an object-oriented modelling 
approach, adopts state machines to define and delineate 
complex protocol service and functional behaviors of IEDs. In 
terms of security and reliability testing for the IEC 61850 
communication stack, the IEC 61850 protocol is more difficult 
to be tested than those without such complex state machines. 
In addition, the IEC 61850 based IEDs to be tested in smart 
substations have complicated logical models, including 
numerous logical nodes, data, and data attributes. Current 
testing approaches for protocol security and reliability are 
based on capturing, mutating, and then replaying messages 
between the tester and the IED. However, due to the 
complexity of IEC 61850, conventional testing methods may 
be inefficient when replaying too many redundant packets. On 
top of that, the test process has to stop when an IED under test 
no longer responds due to malformed packets sent by the 
tester. 
A. Fuzz Testing Implementation in the Test-Bed 
An automatic fuzz testing approach is proposed, and has 
been implemented in the test-bed environment to test the 
security and reliability of the IEC 61850 protocol stack 
implementation, as well as the robustness of IEDs. The core 
idea of the IED robustness testing is to send test cases with 
malformed messages to the IED, and then check the 
communication status of the IED. The robustness of the IED 
depends on its response to the malformed messages. In terms 
of test cases with the same malformed message, the more the 
number of unhandled exceptions and unexpected behaviors 
are, the worse the robustness of the IED is. The proposed 
fuzzing is a black box testing method, which only needs to 
know the IEC 61850 protocol, rather than the specific 
implementation of communication module inside the IED 
[13]. 
In order to implement the above fuzz testing method, a test 
platform has been built, which includes a fuzzing simulator, 
IEDs, a remote-controlled power strip, and a switch, as shown 
in Fig. 3. In Fig. 3, the fuzzing simulator runs the proposed 
fuzz testing method as an IEC 61850 client. The IEDs are IEC 
61850 based servers, which include 10 real protection relays, 
as well as 8 measurement and control devices for 220kV and 
above smart substations. The Ethernet switch connects the 
fuzzing simulator and the IEDs. The power strip in Fig. 3 can 
be remotely controlled by the simulator in order to turn on or 
off the IEDs. The proposed fuzz testing steps are as follows:  
1) As an IEC 61850 client, the fuzzing simulator accesses 
the IED as an IEC 61850 server. In this case, the normal 
communication is built between the IEC 61850 client and the 
server in the test-bed, and normal communication packets are 
captured by Wireshark . 
2) In the fuzzing simulator, the collected messages are 
pre-processed by removing useless and redundant data, in 
order to generate a set of initial sample messages. A number 
of test cases with malformed messages are constructed from 
the sample messages, using mutation-based fuzzing methods. 
3) During the fuzzing process, the malformed messages 
are automatically sent to the IEDs one by one, and the 
malformed messages which cause the IED communication 
failure or status exception are recorded into a log file. 
 
Figure 3.  A test platform for fuzz testing of IEC 61850 
4) The fuzzing simulator can automatically detect the 
status of the IED tested. If the IED is crashed due to the fuzz 
testing, the fuzzing simulator will send a control command to 
the remote-controlled power strip to restart the crashed IED, 
so that the fuzz testing can continue to test the next 
malformed packet after the IED restarting.  
5) After the fuzz testing, the robustness reports of the 
tested IEDs are attained according to the ability of IEDs to 
addressing malformed packets. 
B. Experimental Results 
In the proposed fuzzing test-bed, 18 IEC 61850 based 
IEDs from several mainstream manufacturers were tested 
using the proposed fuzzing approach.  
The fuzz testing revealed that most of the IEDs had cyber 
vulnerabilities, with various levels of risk. The levels of risks 
(i.e., high, medium, low) are defined according to the recovery 
time after the communication disruption. The common 
consequences discovered due to “successful” fuzzing are the 
following:  
? The human machine interface (HMI) of the IED tested 
has no response;  
? The dispatcher in the control center cannot remotely 
control the IEDs in smart substations. 
? The IED cannot normally connect to the monitoring 
system;  
? The IED cannot communicate with the RTU;  
? The IED communication programming is overflowed; 
For example, the fuzzing simulator sent an IEC 
61850/MMS packet with a malformed payload to a real line 
protection relay, as show in Fig. 4. The HMI of the relay 
device under test had no response. 
To be exact, the value of the field packetLength in the 
TPKT layer is abnormal (AF 6D), as shown by the red field in 
Fig. 4. Based on analyzing the captured packets via Wireshark, 
any normal connection request is not successful after the fuzz 
testing, and the abnormal status can only be recovered by 
restarting the device, as shown in Fig. 5. 
Similarly, other vulnerabilities of this relay device are 
identified, as show in Table II. 
 
Figure 4.  The payload of a malformed packet in the fuzzing simulator 
 
Figure 5.  The captered TCP packets in the Wireshark 
TABLE II.  VULNERABILITIES OF THE RELAY UNDER TEST 
Protocol 
layer 
Field 
name 
Abnormal value Consequence Risk level 
TPKT 
Package 
Length 
AF 6D; 9D 7F;  
86 EE; CB D7 ?, ?, ?, ? High 
COTP 
source 
reference 
C3 37 ?, ?, ?, ? High 
Session identifier OC ?, ?, ?, ? High 
MMS Length 00; EB ? Medium 
 
During the fuzzing process, other cyber vulnerabilities in 
the cyber space of the smart substation were identified besides 
the vulnerabilities of IEDs, for example, vulnerabilities of 
operation systems and database, butter overflows of 
configurable software, and overflows of the IEC 61850 
protocol stack. At present, more than 20 types of cyber 
vulnerabilities are collected into a vulnerability database for 
smart substations.  
According to aforementioned discussion and results, the 
proposed fuzzing approach is simple and effective to detect 
the vulnerabilities of IEC 61850 and evaluate the robustness 
of IEDs in the test-bed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Compared with physical security for conventional 
substations, research and development for cybersecurity of 
IEC 61850 based smart substations is still at an early stage. 
This paper proposes a cyber-physical test-bed for smart 
substations to investigate potential vulnerabilities using 
simulated cyber-attacks. The initial investigation results show 
that most of IEDs under test in the test-bed exhibit cyber 
vulnerabilities with various levels of risk. It is important to 
note that these cyber vulnerabilities may affect the secure and 
stable operation of SCADA in the smart substation. Based on 
the test-bed, which is closely matched to the operation of live 
substations, the presented fuzzing approach has been 
implemented and validated. Initial experiments have shown it 
to be effective for identifying cyber vulnerabilities in IEC 
61850 IEDs, and useful to improve the robustness of IEDs in 
smart substations. The cybersecurity test-bed allows end-to-
end testing of cyber-attacks and physical consequences, as 
well as experimental validation of proposed cybersecurity 
countermeasures for smart substations. In response to the 
challenge represented by these inherent device vulnerabilities, 
the authors’ future work focuses on a comprehensive intrusion 
detection and prevention system (IDPS) for IEC 61850 
substations, as shown in Fig. 2. This IDPS will be proposed, 
implemented, and tested using the cyber-physical test-bed 
presented in this work. 
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